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4 June 1979

ATTACHMENT
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CHRONOLOGY ON THE PROCESSING OF CODEWORD CLEARANCES
FOR MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
SURVEYS AND INVESTIGATIONS STAFF

- 18 April The National Security Agency called our Office of Legislative Affairs and requested clearances for Special Compartmented Information (SCI) for the Surveys and Investigations Team that will study SIGINT.
- 19 April Three clearance requests were submitted to the Office of Security which stated that the investigations were out of date (beyond the five year requirement of DCID 1/14). Our information indicated that George T. Prosser and Robert J. Reitwiesner were investigated in 1971, whereas Donald A. Brummitt was last investigated in 1952.
- 20-23 April The National Security Agency was informed that we needed updated background investigations on all three cases. Requested completion of the required Department of Defense biographic forms.
- 27 April Mr. C. R. Anderson, Chief of the Surveys and Investigations Staff, House Appropriations Committee, submitted a formal letter to Mr. Jack L. Stempler, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, requesting updated investigations. Later information indicates that the letter arrived in the Pentagon on 4 May.
- 1 May The Office of Security granted DCID 1/14 waivers on two cases, Prosser and Reitwiesner, and approved SCI access based on the 1971 investigations and assurance that update inquiries would be conducted by the Department of Defense.
- 2-8 May The Office of Legislative Counsel advised the Chief, Surveys and Investigations Staff, that the Agency was prepared to provide security indoctrination briefings for the two cleared staffers, but the offer was declined until the third team member, Brummitt, received his clearance.

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9 May

The Office of Legislative Counsel contacted the Department of Defense for an estimate on the completion of an investigation of the team leader, Brummitt, and was shocked to learn that the necessary forms had not been completed and this would cause a delay.

Mr. Charles W. Snodgrass, a staff assistant for the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, expressed his view to the Office of Legislative Counsel that the Agency was trying to keep them from investigating SIGINT. He requested information on our authority to grant DCID 1/14 waivers, and inquired why we would not grant Brummitt a waiver.

Admiral Inman, Director of the National Security Agency, provided a briefing to the House Appropriations Committee. In response to an inquiry from Mr. Snodgrass, Admiral Inman stated that he had no knowledge of the clearance of the S&I Team. After the briefing, Mr. Snodgrass sent the NSA a number of questions to be answered on the record, including: "Why is it taking so long to clear the S&I Team, Admiral Inman? Is it because you have something to hide, or are you just inefficient?"

10 May

Mr. Snodgrass met with representatives from our Offices of Legislative Counsel and Security, at

expressing his displeasure on the security processing of Brummitt. At this time, he castigated the Office of Security, requested data on our waiver procedures, and he asked for budget and personnel figures for the Office.

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The Office of Legislative Counsel received word from the Federal Bureau of Investigation that codeword clearances would be required for four Bureau agents assigned to the House Appropriations Committee, which wanted the FBI to do the reinvestigations. It was also mentioned at this time that the Committee wanted the FBI to handle the reinvestigation of Brummitt, who is also a Bureau Special Agent.

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- 14 May The Office of Legislative Counsel was in touch with Mr. C. R. Anderson, Chief of the Surveys and Investigations Staff, House Appropriations Committee, who confirmed that the FBI would be handling the reinvestigations, rather than the Department of Defense.
- 15 May Mr. Snodgrass was contacted by our Deputy Legislative Counsel in order to explain the Agency position on the Brummitt case and make it clear that we were not attempting to impede the work of the House Appropriations Committee. Mr. Snodgrass repeated his request for budget and personnel figures of the Office of Security.
- The Office of Legislative Counsel was in touch with the National Security Agency and learned that Mr. Snodgrass had earlier questioned Admiral Inman on the clearance problem. The National Security Agency was coordinating with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, in preparing a chronology which was to be forwarded to the House Appropriations Committee.
- 17 May The Director of Security had occasion to meet with FBI officials and he urged that everything possible be done to assume investigative jurisdiction in the Brummitt case, and otherwise expedite field inquiries. It was on this date that the Office of Security received confirmation that Brummitt was a Special Agent of the FBI.
- 23 May The Federal Bureau of Investigation advised the Office of Security that favorable reinvestigations had been completed on Brummitt and three other Bureau agents, Donald J. Fitzgerald, James Butts, and William Fleshman, Jr. All four individuals were immediately approved, the same day, for access to Special Compartmented Information.
- 1 June The Office of Legislative Counsel requested "Visitor--No Escort" badges for Brummitt, Prosser, and Reitwiesner so that they might have access to the CIA Headquarters Building. These requests were immediately approved, the same day.

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PROCESSING TIME FOR MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
SURVEYS AND INVESTIGATIONS STAFF

The focus of attention is on three staff members of the House Appropriations Committee Surveys and Investigations staff, which was first brought to the attention of the Agency on 18 April 1979.

1. George T. Prosser is on record as having been investigated in 1971, and does not meet the technical requirements of DCID 1/14 of having an investigation within five years. In being advised that an updated investigation had been requested, the Office of Security granted a waiver of DCID 1/14 and approved him for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) on 1 May 1979. The entire clearance process took two weeks (10 working days).

2. Robert J. Reitwiesner is on record as having been investigated in 1971, and does not meet the technical requirements of DCID 1/14 of having an investigation within five years. In being advised that an updated investigation had been requested, the Office of Security granted a waiver of DCID 1/14 and approved him for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) on 1 May 1979. The entire clearance process took two weeks (10 working days).

3. Donald A. Brummitt was on record as having been investigated in 1952, and he did not come close to meeting the requirements of DCID 1/14 of having an investigation within five years. By formal memorandum dated 27 April 1979, the Chief of the Surveys and Investigations Staff, House Appropriations Committee, requested the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs to arrange for the investigation to be brought up to date. There was a delay in the Department of Defense because of a misunderstanding about the required investigative forms, and on 10 May 1979 the House Appropriations Committee requested the Federal Bureau of Investigation to handle the reinvestigation of Mr. Brummitt. We were advised that the investigation was completed on 23 May 1978, and Mr. Brummitt was immediately approved, the same day, for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). The entire clearance process took five weeks (25 working days.)

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4 June 1979

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON POLICIES AND PROCEDURES OF THE OFFICE OF SECURITY IN THE PROCESSING OF CODEWORD CLEARANCE REQUESTS

1. The Office of Security can normally respond in a matter of days--sometimes within 24 hours--when we have solid official confirmation that a favorable investigation has been conducted within five years, and the individual meets the standards of DCID 1/14. We are very responsive to the Office of Legislative Counsel.
2. The Office of Security can, and does, grant waivers of DCID 1/14 investigative standard when the field inquiry is within a reasonable range of the five year requirement, and we know that an updated investigation is in process.
3. The Office of Security does not conduct field investigations on staff members of Congressional committees, and we are thus dependent upon the capabilities of other Government agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Defense Investigative Service of the Department of Defense, which are responsive to the requesting agencies.
4. The FBI has an excellent track record in being able to conduct expeditious field investigations based upon understandings or agreements with the Director of the FBI. The Bureau will not initiate field inquiries on Hill staffers merely because the Office of Security requests this.
5. There are normally no delays in the overall processing of codeword clearance requests when there is a Memorandum of Understanding that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has the responsibility to conduct the field investigations, and this Agency has the responsibility of adjudicating the cases in term of access to Special Compartmented Information (SCI).
6. It is estimated that since 1 March 1979 the Agency has granted twenty (20) waivers on Congressional and NFIB-type cases, and in the same time frame we have granted about 240 waivers for Agency staff employees. Relative to Agency employees, however--we have our own in-house capability immediately to conduct a thorough reinvestigation, and arrange for a RIP polygraph interview.
7. It should be noted that on 10 May 1979, the House Appropriations Committee arranged for the FBI to conduct update

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investigations on several staff members--Donald J. Fitzgerald, James Butts, and William Fleshman, Jr. We were advised that favorable reinvestigations were completed on 23 May 1979, and all three individuals were approved for codeword access the same day. This may establish a precedent for the Bureau in handling these HAC cases, and shows that the system can work if the Committee had made the same arrangements in April 1979 on the Brummitt case.

8. Unlike the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has never had a formal Reinvestigation Program for its own employees, including Bureau agents assigned to the staff of the House Appropriations Committee. Some of the old, traditional Bureau policies are in transition.

9. It is in the best interests of all concerned--the House Appropriations Committee, the Agency, and the Department of Defense--to ensure that investigations are kept up-to-date under the five year rule of DCID 1/14, for HAC staffers having a need of access to Special Compartmented Information. This can preclude crisis situations from developing and is certainly much more efficient.

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DDA 79-1924

1 June 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Don I. Wortman
Deputy Director for Administration

Frank:

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Attached is a memo by Lyle Miller on the issue he mentioned this morning with Snodgrass. Snodgrass feels we have attempted to sabotage the Committee's review of SIGINT through our delay in clearing Dr. Brummitt, one of the members of the Review Team. The matter isn't as simple as that since there are related events that contributed [redacted] and Lyle covers those in the memo. Because of the Brummitt matter, Snodgrass has chosen to ask us for information on our Security division. Based on chats with Hitz, [redacted] Gambino, and [redacted] I think our best posture for Monday is to wait and see if he brings it up. [redacted] and our handling of the clearances of the three Review Team members, on balance, was not all that bad. I will be briefed on this before the hearing and will have a chronology of events that goes into greater detail than Lyle's memo. (C)

[redacted]

Don I. Wortman

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